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Myths of Globalization: Noam Chomsky and Ha-Joon Chang in Conversation

Thursday, June 22, 2017By C.J. Polychroniou, Truthout | Interview
Noam Chomsky. (Photo: Jeanbaptisteparis)Noam Chomsky. (Photo: Jeanbaptisteparis)
Since the late 1970s, the world's economy and dominant nations have been marching to the tune of (neoliberal) globalization, whose impact and effects on average people's livelihood and communities everywhere are generating great popular discontent, accompanied by a rising wave of nationalist and anti-elitist sentiments. But what exactly is driving globalization? And who really benefits from globalization? Are globalization and capitalism interwoven? How do we deal with the growing levels of inequality and massive economic insecurity? Should progressives and radicals rally behind the call for the introduction of a universal basic income? In the unique and exclusive interview below, two leading minds of our time, linguist and public intellectual Noam Chomsky and Cambridge University economist Ha-Joon Chang, share their views on these essential questions. 
C. J. Polychroniou: Globalization is usually referred to as a process of interaction and integration among the economies and people of the world through international trade and foreign investment with the aid of information technology. Is globalization then simply a neutral, inevitable process of economic, social and technological interlinkages, or something of a more political nature in which state action produces global transformations (state-led globalization)?
Ha-Joon Chang: The biggest myth about globalization is that it is a process driven by technological progress. This has allowed the defenders of globalization to brand the critics as "modern Luddites" who are trying to turn back the clock against the relentless progress of science and technology.
However, if technology is what determines the degree of globalization, how can you explain that the world was far more globalized in the late 19th and the early 20th century than in the mid-20th century? During the first Liberal era, roughly between 1870 and 1914, we relied upon steamships and wired telegraphy, but the world economy was on almost all accounts more globalized than during the far less liberal period in the mid-20th century (roughly between 1945 and 1973), when we had all the technologies of transportation and communications that we have today, except for the internet and cellular phones, albeit in less efficient forms.
The reason why the world was much less globalized in the latter period is that, during the period, most countries imposed rather significant restrictions on the movements of goods, services, capital and people, and liberalized them only gradually. What is notable is that, despite [its] lower degree of globalization … this period is when capitalism has done the best: the fastest growth, the lowest degree of inequality, the highest degree of financial stability, and -- in the case of the advanced capitalist economies -- the lowest level of unemployment in the 250-year history of capitalism. This is why the period is often called "the Golden Age of Capitalism."
Technology only sets the outer boundary of globalization -- it was impossible for the world to reach a high degree of globalization with only sail ships. It is economic policy (or politics, if you like) that determines exactly how much globalization is achieved in what areas.
The current form of market-oriented and corporate-driven globalization is not the only -- not to speak of being the best -- possible form of globalization. A more equitable, more dynamic and more sustainable form of globalization is possible.
We know that globalization properly began in the 15th century, and that there have been different stages of globalization since, with each stage reflecting the underlying impact of imperial state power and of the transformations that were taking place in institutional forms, such as firms and the emergence of new technologies and communications. What distinguishes the current stage of globalization (1973-present) from previous ones?
Chang: The current stage of globalization is different from the previous ones in two important ways.
The first difference is that there is less open imperialism.
Before 1945, the advanced capitalist countries practised [overt] imperialism. They colonized weaker countries or imposed "unequal treaties" on them, which made them virtual colonies -- for example, they occupied parts of territories through "leasing," deprived them of the right to set tariffs, etc.
Since 1945, we have seen the emergence of a global system that rejects such naked imperialism. There has been a continuous process of de-colonialization and, once you get sovereignty, you became a member of the United Nations, which is based upon the principle of one-country-one-vote.
Of course, the practice has been different -- the permanent members of the Security Council of the UN have a veto and many international economic organizations (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank) are run on the principle of one-dollar-one-vote (voting rights are linked to paid-in capital). However, even so, the post-1945 world order was immeasurably better than the one that came before it.
Unfortunately, starting in the 1980s but accelerating from the mid-1990s, there has been a rollback of the sovereignty that the post-colonial countries had been enjoying. The birth of the WTO (World Trade Organization) in 1995 has shrunk the "policy space" for developing countries. The shrinkage was intensified by subsequent series of bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements between rich countries and developing ones, like Free Trade Agreements with the US and Economic Partnership agreements with the European Union.
The second thing that distinguishes the post-1973 globalization is that it has been driven by transnational corporations far more than before. Transnational corporations existed even from the late 19th century, but their economic importance has vastly increased since the 1980s.
They have also influenced the shaping of the global rules in a way that enhances their power. Most importantly, they have inserted the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism into many international agreements. Through this mechanism, transnational corporations can take governments to a tribunal of three adjudicators, drawn from a pool of largely pro-corporate international commercial lawyers, for having reduced their profits through regulations. This is an unprecedented extension of corporate power.
Noam, are globalization and capitalism different?
Noam Chomsky: If by "globalization" we mean international integration, then it long pre-dates capitalism. The silk roads dating back to the pre-Christian era were an extensive form of globalization. The rise of industrial state capitalism has changed the scale and character of globalization, and there have been further changes along the way as the global economy has been reshaped by those whom Adam Smith called "the masters of mankind," pursuing their "vile maxim": "All for ourselves, and nothing for other people."
There have been quite substantial changes during the recent period of neoliberal globalization, since the late 1970s, with Reagan and Thatcher the iconic figures -- though the policies vary only slightly as administrations change. Transnational corporations are the driving force, and their political power largely shapes state policy in their interests.
During these years, supported by the policies of the states they largely dominate, transnational corporations have increasingly constructed global value chains (GVCs) in which the "lead firm" outsources production through intricate global networks that it establishes and controls. A standard illustration is Apple, the world's biggest company. Its iPhone is designed in the US. Parts from many suppliers in the US and East Asia are assembled mostly in China in factories owned by the huge Taiwanese firm Foxconn. Apple's profit is estimated to be about 10 times that of Foxconn, while value added and profit in China, where workers toil under miserable conditions, is slight. Apple then sets up an office in Ireland so as to evade US taxes -- and has recently been fined $14 billion by the EU in back taxes.
Reviewing the "GVC world" in the British journal International Affairs, Nicola Phillips writes that production for Apple involves thousands of firms and enterprises that have no formal relationship with Apple, and at the lower tiers may be entirely unaware of the destination of what they are producing. This is a situation that generalizes.
The immense scale of this new globalized system is revealed in the 2013 World Investment Report of the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development. It estimates that some 80 percent of global trade is internal to the global value chains established and run by transnational corporations, accounting for perhaps 20 percent of jobs worldwide.

National wealth by conventional measures has declined. But US corporate ownership of the globalized economy has exploded.

Ownership of this globalized economy has been studied by political economist Sean Starrs. He points out that the conventional estimates of national wealth in terms of GDP are misleading in the era of neoliberal globalization. With complex integrated supply chains, subcontracting and other such devices, corporate ownership of the world's wealth is becoming a more realistic measure of global power than national wealth, as the world departs more than before from the model of nationally discrete political economies. Investigating corporate ownership, Starrs finds that in virtually every economic sector – manufacturing, finance, services, retail and others -- US corporations are well in the lead in ownership of the global economy. Overall, their ownership is close to 50 percent of the total. That is roughly the maximum estimate of US national wealth in 1945, at the historical peak of US power. National wealth by conventional measures has declined from 1945 to the present, to maybe 20 percent. But US corporate ownership of the globalized economy has exploded.
The standard line of mainstream politicians is that globalization benefits everyone. Yet, globalization produces winners and losers, as Branko Milanovic's book Global Inequality has shown, so the question is this: Is success in globalization a matter of skills?
Chang: The assumption that globalization benefits everyone is based on mainstream economic theories that assume that workers can be costlessly re-deployed, if international trade or cross-border investments make certain industries unviable.
In this view, if the US signs NAFTA with Mexico, some auto workers in the US may lose their jobs, but they will not lose out, as they can retrain themselves and get jobs in industries that are expanding, thanks to NAFTA, such as software or investment banking.
You will immediately see the absurdity of the argument -- how many US auto workers do you know who have retrained themselves as software engineers or investment bankers in the last couple of decades? Typically, ex-auto-workers fired from their jobs have ended up working as night-shift janitors in a warehouse or stacking shelves in supermarkets, drawing much lower wages than before.
The point is that, even if the country gains overall from globalization, there will always be losers, especially (although not exclusively) workers who have skills that are not valued anymore. And unless these losers are compensated, you cannot say that the change is a good thing for "everyone".…
Of course, most rich countries have mechanisms through which the winners from the globalization process (or any economic change, really) compensate the losers. The basic mechanism for this is the welfare state, but there are also publicly financed retraining and job-search mechanisms -- the Scandinavians do this particularly well -- as well as sector-specific schemes to compensate the "losers" (e.g., temporary protection for firms to promote restructuring, money for severance payments for the workers). These mechanisms are better in some countries than others, but nowhere are they perfect and, unfortunately, some countries have been running them down. (The recent shrinkage of the welfare state in the UK is a good example.)
In your view, Ha-Joon Chang, is the convergence of globalization and technology likely to produce more or less inequality?
Chang: As I have argued above, technology and globalization are not destiny.
The fact that income inequality actually fell in Switzerland between 1990 and 2000 and the fact that income inequality has hardly increased in Canada and the Netherlands during the neoliberal period show that countries can choose what income inequality they have, even though they are all faced with the same technologies and same trends in the global economy.
There is actually a lot that countries can do to influence income inequality. Many European countries, including Germany, France, Sweden and Belgium are as unequal as (or occasionally even more so than) the US, before they redistribute income through progressive tax and the welfare state. Because they redistribute so much, the resulting inequalities in those countries are much lower.
Noam, in what ways does globalization increase capitalism's inherent tendencies toward economic dependence, inequality and exploitation?
Chomsky: Globalization during the era of industrial capitalism has always enhanced dependence, inequality and exploitation, often to horrendous extremes. To take a classic example, the early industrial revolution relied crucially on cotton, produced mainly in the American South in the most vicious system of slavery in human history -- which took new forms after the Civil War with the criminalization of Black life and sharecropping. Today's version of globalization includes not only super-exploitation at the lower tiers of the global value chains system but also virtual genocide, notably in Eastern Congo where millions have been slaughtered in recent years while critical minerals find their way to high-tech devices produced in the global value chains.
But even apart from such hideous elements of globalization ... pursuit of the "vile maxim" quite naturally yields such consequences. The Phillips study I mentioned is a rare example of inquiry into "how inequalities are produced and reproduced in a [global value chains] world [through] asymmetries of market power, asymmetries of social power, and asymmetries of political power." As Phillips shows, "The consolidation and mobilization of these market asymmetries rests on securing a structure of production in which a small number of very large firms at the top, in many cases the branded retailers, occupy oligopolistic positions -- that is, positions of market dominance, and in which the lower tiers of production are characterized by densely populated and intensely competitive markets…. The consequence across the world has been the explosive growth of precarious, insecure and exploitative work in global production, performed by a workforce significantly made up of informal, migrant, contract and female workers, and extending at the end of the spectrum to the purposeful use of forced labour."
These consequences are enhanced by deliberate trade and fiscal policies, a matter discussed particularly by Dean Baker. As he points out, in the US, "from December 1970 to December of 2000, manufacturing employment was virtually unchanged, apart from cyclical ups and downs. In the next seven years, from December of 2000 to December of 2007, manufacturing employment fell by more than 3.4 million, a drop of almost 20 percent. This plunge in employment was due to the explosion of the trade deficit over this period, not automation. There was plenty of automation (a.k.a. productivity growth) in the three decades from 1970 to 2000, but higher productivity was offset by an increase in demand, leaving total employment little changed. This was no longer true when the trade deficit exploded to almost 6 percent of GDP in 2005 and 2006 (more than $1.1 trillion in today's economy)."
These were substantially consequences of the high-dollar policy and the investor-rights agreements masquerading as "free trade" -- among the political choices in the interests of the masters, not the results of economic laws.
Ha-Joon Chang, progressives aim to develop strategies to counter the adverse effects of globalization, but there is little agreement on the most effective and realistic way to do so. In this context, the responses vary from alternative forms of globalization to localization? What's your take on this matter?
Chang: In short, my preferred option would be a more controlled form of globalization, based on far more restrictions on global flows of capital and more restrictions on the flows of goods and services. Moreover, even with these restrictions, there will inevitably be winners and losers, and you need a stronger (not weaker) welfare state and other mechanisms through which the losers from the process get compensated. Politically, such a policy combination will require stronger voices for workers and citizens.
I don't think localization is a solution, although the feasibility of localization will depend on what the locality is and what issues we are talking about. If the locality in question is one village or a neighborhood in an urban area, you will immediately see that there are very few things that can be "localised." If you are talking about a German land (state) or US state, I can see how it can try to grow more of its own food or produce some currently imported manufactured products for itself. However, for most things, it is simply not viable to have the majority of things supplied locally. It would be unwise to have every country, not to speak of every American state, manufacture its own airplanes, mobile phones, or even all of its food.
Having said that, I am not against all forms of localization. There are certainly things that can be more locally provided, like certain food items or health care.
One final question: The idea of a universal basic income is slowly but gradually gaining ground as a policy tool in order to address the problem of poverty and concerns over automation. In fact, companies like Google and Facebook are strong advocates of a universal basic income, although it will be societies bearing the cost of this policy while most multinational firms move increasingly to using robots and other computer-assisted techniques for performing tasks traditionally done by labor. Should progressives and opponents of capitalist globalization in general support the idea of a universal basic income?
Chang: Universal basic income (UBI) has many different versions, but it is a libertarian idea in the sense that it puts emphasis on maximizing individual freedom rather than on collective identity and solidarity.
All citizens in countries at more than middle-income level have some entitlements to a basic amount of resources. (In the poorer countries, there are virtually none.) They have access to some health care, education, pension, water and other "basic" things in life. The idea behind UBI is that the resource entitlements should be provided to individuals in cash (rather than in kind) as much as possible, so that they can exercise maximum choice.
The right-wing version of UBI, supported by Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, the gurus of neoliberalism, is that the government should provide its citizens with a basic income at the subsistence level, while providing no (or little) further goods and services. As far as I can see, this is the version of UBI supported by the Silicon Valley companies. I am totally against this.
There are left-wing libertarians who support UBI, who would set its level quite high, which would require quite a high degree of income redistribution. But they too believe that collective provision of "basic" goods and services through the welfare state should be minimized (although their "minimum" would be considerably larger than the neo-liberal one). This version is more acceptable to me, but I am not convinced by it.
First, if the members of a society are collectively provisioning some goods and services, they have the collective right to influence how people use their basic entitlements.
Second, provision through a citizenship-based universal welfare state makes social services like health, education, child care, unemployment insurance and pensions much cheaper through bulk purchases and pooling of risk. The fact that the US spends at least 50 percent more on health care than other rich countries do (17 percent of GDP in the US compared to at most 11.5 percent of GDP in Switzerland) but has the worst health indicators is very suggestive of the potential problems that we could have in a system of UBI combined with private provision of basic social services, even if the level of UBI is high.
Chomsky: The answer, I think, is: "it all depends" -- namely, on the socioeconomic and political context in which the idea is advanced. The society to which we should aspire, I think, would respect the concept "jedem nach seinen Bedürfnissen": to each according to their needs. Among the primary needs for most people is a life of dignity and fulfillment. That translates in particular as work undertaken under their own control, typically in solidarity and interaction with others, creative and of value to the society at large. Such work can take many forms: building a beautiful and needed bridge, the challenging task of teaching-and-learning with young children, solving an outstanding problem in number theory, or myriad other options. Providing for such needs is surely within the realm of possibility.
In the current world, firms increasingly turn to automation, as they have been doing as far back as we look; the cotton gin, for example. Currently, there is little evidence that the effects are beyond the norm. Major impacts would show up in productivity, which is in fact low by the standards of the early post-World War II era. Meanwhile there is a great deal of work to be done -- from reconstructing collapsing infrastructure, to establishing decent schools, to advancing knowledge and understanding, and far more. There are many willing hands. There are ample resources. But the socioeconomic system is so dysfunctional that it is not capable of bringing these factors together in a satisfactory way -- and under the current Trump-Republican campaign to create a tiny America trembling within walls, the situation can only become worse. Insofar as robots and other forms of automation can free people from routine and dangerous work and liberate them for more creative endeavors (and, particularly in the leisure-deprived US, with time for themselves), that's all to the good. UBI could have a place, though it is too crude an instrument to achieve the preferable Marxist version.
Copyright, Truthout. May not be reprinted without permission.

The Useful Idiots Who Undermine Dissent on Syria

Those who support, either explicitly or implicitly, the meddling in Syria’s affairs by hostile foreign powers are, of course, delighted that Hersh’s revelations are being kept out of the spotlight. They don’t want every side heard, only their side. And those of us who expect all the evidence to be aired, so we aren’t corralled into yet another disastrous “intervention” in the Middle East, are being mischievously denounced as Assad loyalists.
A good example of this kind of wilful misrepresentation is by Brian Whitaker, the Guardian’s former Middle East editor. In a recent blog post, he has accused me and Media Lens, among others, of being “loyal supporters of Hersh” – and by insinuation, of Syrian leader Bashar Assad – of being “sarin denialists”, and of demonstrating blatant hypocrisy in approving Hersh’s use of anonymous sources when we oppose reliance on such sources by other journalists.
Before I address these criticisms, let’s briefly recap on what Hersh’s investigation found.
His sources in the US intelligence establishment have countered an official narrative – spread by western governments and the corporate media – that assumes Assad was behind a chemical weapons attack on the town of Khan Sheikhoun on April 4. Hersh’s account suggests that Syria used a conventional bomb to hit a jihadist meeting in the town, triggering secondary explosions in a storage depot containing pesticides, fertilisers and chlorine-based decontaminants. A toxic cloud was created that caused symptoms similar to sarin for those nearby.
Trump was so convinced that Assad had used sarin in Khan Sheikhoun that he violated international law and fired 59 Tomahawk missiles at a Syrian airbase as punishment, even though, according to Hersh, his own intelligence community disputed that this is what had happened. Given that Vladimir Putin is closely allied with Assad, the move had the potential to drag Russia into a dangerous confrontation with the US.
Loyal only to fair debate
So let me address Whitaker’s allegations.
1/ Neither I nor Media Lens are “loyal supporters” of Hersh – or Assad. Whitaker is projecting. He has chosen a side in Syria – that of what he simplistically terms the “rebels”, now dominated by Al-Qaeda affiliates and ISIS, backed by an unholy alliance of Saudi Arabia, the US, Europe, Israel and Turkey. But not everyone who opposes the Islamic extremists, or Whitaker’s group of western interventionists, has therefore chosen Assad’s side.
One can choose the side of international law and respect for the sovereignty of nation-states, and object to states fomenting proxy wars to destabilise and destroy other regimes.
More than that, one can choose to maintain a critical distance and, based on experience, remain extremely wary of official and self-serving narratives promoted by the world’s most powerful states. Some of us think there are lessons to be learnt from the lies we were told about WMD in Iraq, or a supposedly imminent massacre by Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi in Benghazi.
These examples of deception should be remembered when we try to assess how probable is the story that Assad wanted to invite yet more destructive interference in his country from foreign powers by gassing his own people – and to no obvious strategic or military advantage. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me three times, I should just admit I am a gullible fool.
I and Media Lens (if I may presume to speak on their behalf as a longtime follower) are not arguing that Hersh’s account must be right. Just that it deserves attention, and that it should be part of the media / public discourse. What concerns us is the inadmissibility of relevant information to the public realm, and concerted efforts to stifle debate. Manufactured groupthink, it has been repeatedly shown, works to the benefit of the powerful, those promoting the destructive interests of a now-global military-industrial complex.
Whitaker and the interventionists want only the official narrative allowed, the one that serves their murky political agenda; we want countervailing voices heard too. That doesn’t make us anyone’s loyalists. It makes us loyal only to the search for transparency and truth.
Who’s really being flaky?
2/ Whitaker suggests that I and Media Lens have ascribed the failure by the corporate media to report on Hersh’s investigation to a “conspiracy”. He argues instead that Hersh has been ignored because “editors found [his recent Syria] articles flaky”.
Neither I nor Media Lens, of course, are claiming the corporate media’s decision is a conspiracy. Like most mainstream journalists, Whitaker shows how ignorant he is of the most famous critique of his own profession: Noam Chomsky and Ed Herman’s Propaganda Model. That posits not a conspiracy by journalists but structural factors that make a corporate-owned media, one dependent on corporate advertising, incapable of allowing any meaningful pluralism of the kind that might threaten its own core interests. That is no more to state a conspiracy than it would be to argue that corporations are driven by profit. It is simply to recognise the nature of the beast.
Aside from that, Whitaker treats Hersh as though he is a one-off – a lone, non-credible voice with a hidden pro-Assad agenda, using anonymous sources in the US intelligence world, presumably with the same hidden agenda. Those like me who want Hersh’s account visible are dismissed as “sarin denialists”, partisans so blinded by our secret love of Assad that we refuse to admit the evidence staring us in the face.
But Whitaker is mischaracterising the evidence. The doubts raised by Hersh’s investigation have been shared by former senior intelligence and security officials, such as Lawrence Wilkerson, Philip Giraldi and Ray McGovern, as well as journalists with extensive contacts in the intelligence field, such Robert Parry and Gareth Porter.
Concerns with the official narrative have also been raised by undoubted experts on ballistic and chemical weapons issues, such as Ted Postol and Scott Ritter. They doubt a sarin attack by Assad’s forces took place, based on technical matters they are well-placed to judge.
Remember it was Ritter, a weapons inspector in Iraq, who warned that Saddam Hussein had no WMDs as the US and UK were making precisely the opposite, mendacious case for war. Ritter’s voice was excluded from the corporate media in 2002-03, precisely when it might have pulled the rug from under those in the political and media establishments cheering on the disastrous US-UK invasion of Iraq.
Whitaker and the interventionists argue, apparently with a straight face, that this time the corporate media are silencing Hersh only because of a supposed “flakiness” in his journalism. So how do they explain the fact that in 2002-03 the same media silenced experts like Ritter and Hans Blix, former head of the UN agency monitoring Iraq’s weapons programme, while aggressively promoting entirely flaky individuals like the supposed Iraqi “opposition leader” Ahmed Chalabi? If the media considered Ritter and Blix, but not Chalabi, as flaky in the run-up to the illegal Iraq invasion, maybe it’s time for Whitaker and editors like him to reassess the meaning of “flaky”.
No hypocrisy over sources
3/ Finally, what of the claim that it is hypocritical to allow Hersh his anonymous sources when we disapprove of them in other cases?
First, the issue of using anonymous sources does not need to be judged according to our own standards, but rather those of the corporate media. Mainstream editors have repeatedly proved they have absolutely no problem using anonymous sources when they support the official narrative, one that promotes war. Liberal papers like the New York Times are filled most days with stories from unnamed officials, telling us what we are supposed to believe. The fake “revelations” of Saddam’s WMD were largely sourced over many months from anonymous officials. Whitaker himself worked as an editor at the Guardian when it was running similarly unverifiable stories from anonymous sources.
So our complaints about Hersh’s treatment are based, in part, on the glaring hypocrisy of journalists like Whitaker. Why are anonymous sources fine when they confirm the narrative of the security state, but problematic – “flaky” – when they challenge it? Whitaker doesn’t have a problem with Hersh using anonymous sources, any more than does the Guardian, New York Times, New Yorker, or London Review of Books. They have a problem with Hersh using anonymous sources when those sources say things that are not supposed to be said.
And second, there is a world of difference between using anonymous sources to reveal things the powerful do not want stated, and using anonymous sources to say exactly what the security state wants to be said but does not want to be held accountable for.
Whistleblowers and those who challenge the powerful often need protection in the form of anonymity from the likely retaliation of state actors. Anonymity is never ideal, but sometimes it is necessary. And when necessary, as in the case of whistleblowers, safeguards should be put in place. They appear to have been in the case of the Hersh investigation. Fact-checkers like Scott Ritter were used to ensure the story was technically plausible, and Welt editors say they were given the identities of Hersh’s sources. The intelligence officials who spoke to Hersh may be unknown to the reader, but they are apparently known to the editors overseeing the story’s publication.
Contrast that to the anonymous government, military and intelligence officials who regularly brief journalists anonymously, often to spread what turns out to be misinformation. There is no reason why any official needs to be unnamed when they are acting as spokesperson for their government. The only protection such anonymity confers is protection from accountability.
Tearing apart the left
Finally, it is worth noting that Syria has become a hugely divisive issue on the left, as Libya did before it. It has made the left all but powerless to advance any kind of critique of western imperialism and its current round of violent interference in the Middle East.
The spirit that spurred the global marches in 2003 against the attack on Iraq has dissipated. The left’s confusion allowed Libya to be torn to shreds on the pretext of a non-existent threat to Benghazi. And now Syria is being wrecked by proxy wars in which the west is a central, if largely veiled actor.
None of this is accidental. The US has long had a plan to destabilise and break apart the Middle East – sometimes referred to by officials as “remaking” it –  to better control the region’s resources. And hand in glove with this plan are efforts to destabilise and break apart those who should be dissenting from the latest bouts of western imperialism.

: ۲۴ سالگی میانگین سن افرادی است که نخستین بار مواد مخدر مصرف کرده اند.

راساس آمار دو میلیون و ۸۰۸ هزار معتاد در کشور وجود دارند، گفت: در سال ۵۷ آمار معتادان با توجه به جمعیت ۳۶ میلیونی ایران، حدود یک میلیون و ۸۰۰ هزار نفر بود.

 پوشش پیشگیرانه ای که دولت در این زمینه انجام داد فقط ۱۵ درصد از معتادان را تحت پوشش قرار داد اما از دو سال پیش که سازمان های مردم نهاد مبارزه با مصرف مواد مخدر از حدود ۱۲۰۰ سازمان به ۲۳۶۵ سازمان رسیده است، در یک سال گذشته ۳۸ درصد پوشش پیشگیرانه استفاده از مواد مخدر افزایش یافته است.

 حدود ۱۰ درصد جمعیت معتاد کشور را زنان تشکیل می دهند و الگوی مصرف مواد مخدر در مقایسه با سال ۹۰ تغییر کرده است.

ا در سال ۹۰ پس از تریاک، شیشه رتبه دوم مصرف را داشت اما در سال ۹۴ ماریجوآنا و مشتقات آن در رتبه دوم قرار گرفته اند و شیشه به مقام چهارم نزول کرده است.
 
وی میانگین سن مصرف مواد مخدر در کشور را ۲۴ سالگی اعلام و اضافه کرد: خرید و فروش مواد مخدر به وسیله فضای مجازی در حال گسترش است.
 
افشار گفت: یک معتاد در کشور لازم نیست زمان زیادی را برای دسترسی به مواد مخدر صرف کند.

وی با بیان اینکه دسترسی به مواد مخدر و قیمت آن برای مصرف کننده اهمیت دارد، افزود: دسترسی به این مواد در ایران بسیار آسان است.

سخنگوی ستاد مبارزه با مواد مخدر گفت: در دو سال اخیر تحت پوشش قرار دادن مراکز حساس مانند دانشگاه ها، مدارس، پارکها و ... را در اولویت پیشگیری از مصرف مواد مخدر قرار داده ایم.

افشار درباره صحت آمار تعداد معتادان افزود: این آمار بر اساس کار علمی دقیق و به وسیله کارشناسان به دست آمده و تا حدودی قابل قبول است.

وی گفت: بر اساس نظر کارشناسان، ضریب خطای این آمار مثبت یا منفی پنج درصد است.
افشار افزود: اکنون مصرف مشتقات ماریجوآنا مانند گل، گراس و علف زیاد و مصرف شیشه کاهش یافته است.

وی گفت: اگر مصرف کننده تریاک حدود ۲۰ سال طول می کشید به انتهای خط برسد برای مصرف کننده شیشه این زمان حداکثر شش سال است.

سعید صفاتیان رئیس کارگروه مبارزه با مواد مخدر مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نظام نیز در این برنامه با زیر سؤال بردن آمار تعداد معتادان در کشور گفت: نوع سؤال هایی که از افراد می شود؛ آمارهای معتادان را دچار چالش می کند.

وی افزود: نوع سؤال ها، جمعیت پنهان معتاد را ایجاد می کند و نمی توان تعداد معتادان را تخمین زد.

صفاتیان گفت: اکنون هشت درصد معتادان از شیشه استفاده می کنند در حالی که در سال ۹۰   ۲۵ درصد آنها شیشه مصرف می کردند.

وی افزود: بیش از ۵۰ تن مواد مخدر سالانه در کشور استفاده می شود. رئیس کارگروه مبارزه با مواد مخدر مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نظام گفت: در حالی که مصرف مواد مخدر در ۲۰ سال پیش تک الگویی بود اما اکنون چند الگویی بودن مصرف مواد مخدر درمان، مبارزه و پیشگیری از اعتیاد را ناکارآمد کرده است.

صفاتیان افزود: با توجه ضعف اجرای سیاست های کلی مبارزه با مواد مخدر که در سال ۸۵ ابلاغ شد، نیاز داریم در سطح کلان مدیریتی این مسئله تغییر ایجاد شود.

وی گفت: با توجه به حجم زیاد کاری مسئولان ستاد مبارزه با مواد مخدر، این ستاد باید به صورت خاص به یک نفر سپرده شود.

صفاتیان افزود: مسئولان میانی، مبارزه با مواد مخدر را ذاتی نمی دانند. وی گفت: ضعف ما در ارزیابی و نظارت بر برنامه های مبارزه با مواد مخدر است.

عباس دیلمی زاده فعال مبارزه با مواد مخدر نیز در این برنامه گفت: در خصوص پدیده شیوع شناسی و آمار اعتیاد با سر در گمی شدید روبرو هستیم.

وی افزود: با توجه به تعداد معتادان، کمتر از ۲۵ درصد از آنها معادل ۷۸۰ هزار نفر تحت پوشش برنامه های درمان اعتیاد هستند.
دیلمی زاده گفت: ۲۴ سالگی میانگین سن افرادی است که نخستین بار مواد مخدر مصرف کرده اند.
 
وی افزود: در حالی که معتادان استفاده از تریاک، هروئین و شیشه را پنهان می کنند اما اعتیاد به ماریجوآنا را پنهان نمی کنند.
بابک پارسی
يزد نخستين شهر خشتي جهان و نيز دومين شهر تاريخي جهان پس از ونيز ايتاليا است.
يزد، شهري كه از ديد آمار باسوادي در جايگاه شهرهاي نخست كشور و نيز شهري است كه ٢٣ سال پياپي جايگاه نخست پذيرش در كنكور سراسري را به خود ویژه کرده است.
این شهر زادگاه نام‌آوراني چون ارباب رستم گيو، وحشي بافقي، فرخي يزدي، كتايون مزداپور، مهدي آذريزدي، ايرج افشار، محمدعلي اسلامي ندوشن، محمدحسين پاپلي يزدي و ...است.
يزد از ريشه‌ی يَزَتَ به چم ستودني كه با مهرازي‌(:معماری)هاي ويژه و كويري خود چشم هر گردشگر و بيننده‌اي را از هنر سيراب مي‌كند.
چندي پيش در سفري كه به شهر نياكاني خود يزد، و محله‌مان روستای خرمشاه داشتم شوربختانه با صحنه‌هايي روبه رو شدم كه بسيار دردآور و تأثيرگذار بود.
سراسر اين محله‌ی کهن
پر شده از خانه‌هاي خشت و گلي فروريخته و ويران شده كه در سايه‌ی بي‌مهری مسوولان ميراث فرهنگي و نيز ناآگاهی مردم به تلي از خاك تبديل شده‌اند. همانگونه كه اين فرتورها(:تصاوير) گويا هستند، جهاني از هنر و ذوق به يك‌باره فرو ريخته‌اند.
مگرنه اينكه شهر يزد به شهر خشت نامور است؟ و اين خشت‌ها برگي از شناسنامه شهر يزد به شمار می روند؟
شهر يزد بدون اين آثار ديگر هويتي ندارد.هنگامي كه با برخي از مردم بومی گفت‌وگو مي‌كردم، آگاه شدم كه مالکان بعضي از خانه‌ها سال‌هاست كه كوچيده و ترك میهن كرده‌اند و اين بناهاي زيبا با ورودي‌ها و تاق‌هاي چشم‌نواز و بادگيرهاي زيبا و بي‌مانند را به حال خود رها كرده‌اند. همين امر يكي ديگر از شوند(:دليل)هايي است كه مانع ياري رساندن و پیشگیری از تخريب اين بناها شده است.
اگر بخواهيم منصفانه و دادگرانه برخورد كنيم، نبايد نوك پيكان خرده‌گیری‌(:انتقاد)ها را تنها و تنها به سوي مسوولان نشانه برويم.
درست است كه ميراث فرهنگي در بررسي و ثبت آثار و رسيدگي به آن‌ها بسيار نقص دارد و آنگونه كه درخور و شايسته اين شهر بودهد عمل نكرده است اما مردم هم در اين ميان بي‌گناه نيستند.
بزرگ‌ترين گناه مردم نخست بي‌تفاوتي نسبت به ويراني اين آثار و سپس آلوده كرده محل با زباله‌هاست . كه نمونه‌ی آن همين آب انبار تالار سرور است كه داراي پلاك ثبتي است. مردم هم پاي اين بنا زباله‌هاي خود را رها مي‌كنند و هم آتش می‌افروزند و با رنگ بر روي ديوار مي‌نويسند و مسوولان نيز آنگونه كه بايد در ترميم اين آثار كمر همت و كوشش را نبسته‌اند.
اميد آن است كه با بلند نظري دست‌اندركاران و دلسوزي مردم ديگر شاهد چنين رخدادهايي نباشيم.
اي صبا با ساكنان شهر يزد از ما بگو
كاي سر حق ناشناسان گوي چوگان شما



همچنان كه از كوچه پس كوچه‌هاي محل مي‌گذريم، در كنار ويراني‌ها چيزي كه بسيار آزار دهنده است بودن زباله‌ها، پاي هر ديوار و بناي تاريخي ثبت میراث شده است

چین، "حاتم طائی" در آفریقا به دنبال چیست؟

نام آفریقا برای بسیاری از مردم با گرسنگی و فقر و جنگ عجین شده؛ اما نه برای چینی‌ها. چین سال‌هاست که با کمک‌های مالی فراوان و زیرساختی، اعتماد دولت‌های آفریقایی را جلب کرده است. اما چین از این همه بخشش چه می‌خواهد؟
 
تماشای ویدیو02:26
فقر و گرسنگی و جنگ؛ در نزد اروپایی‌ها این‌ها موضوعاتی هستند که با نام آفریقا پیوند خورده‌اند. اما چینی‌ها جور دیگری می‌اندیشند. آنها در آفریقا بخت دستیابی به بازار بزرگی را می‌بینند که می‌توانند تولیداتشان را در آن به فروش برسانند. مواد خام آفریقا هم به اندازه کافی به چینی‌ها انگیزه بودن و ماندن در آفریقا را می‌دهد. در طی ۱۵ سال اخیر چین در آفریقا اثری از خود باقی گذاشت که تمامی کمک‌های توسعه‌ای کشورهای غربی در آن گم شده است. چین برایشان کارهای زیادی کرده؛ از ساخت راه‌آهن، فرودگاه بیمارستان و کارخانه گرفته تا استادیوم ورزشی.

شرکت توتال با ایران قراردادی چندمیلیارد دلاری امضا می‌کند


Petrochemieanlage im Iran (AP)
شرکت انرژی توتال فرانسه دوشنبه ۱۲ تیر (۳ ژوئیه) به منظور توسعه میدان گازی پارس جنوبی قراردادی چندمیلیاردی با ایران امضا خواهد کرد.
خبرگزاری فرانسه به نقل از وزارت نفت ایران نوشت، این قرارداد با هدف توسعه فاز ۱۱ پارس جنوبی، با حضور وزیر نفت ایران، مدیران شرکت‌های توتال و شرکت ملی نفت چین و مدیر شرکت ایرانی پتروپارس امضا خواهد شد.

رویترز نیز در خبری مشابه به نقل از یک مقام وزارت نفت ایران نوشت که این قرارداد بزرگ‌ترین سرمایه‌گذاری‌ غربی در بخش انرژی ایران بعد از توافق هسته‌ای و لغو تحریم‌ها علیه ایران است.
به نقل از رسانه‌های ایران، قرار است این قرارداد در باغ کوشک وزارت نفت در تهران امضا شود.
"موافقتنامه اصولی" طرح توسعه فاز ۱۱ پارس جنوبی میان شرکت ملی نفت ایران با کنسرسیومی متشکل از شرکت توتال فرانسه، شرکت ملی نفت چین و شرکت پتروپارس در نوامبر ۲۰۱۶  امضا شد.
طبق این موافقتنامه، قرار شد ۱/ ۵۰ درصد از سهام این پروژه ۴ میلیارد و هشتصدهزار دلاری (۴ میلیارد و دویست میلیون یورویی) از آن شرکت توتال باشد.
دو شرکت ملی نفت چین (CNPC) و پتروپارس نیز به ترتیب ۳۰ درصد و ۹/ ۱۹درصد سهم خواهند داشت.
شرکت توتال در ابتدا یک میلیارد دلار برای اولین مرحله این پروژه ۲۰ ساله پرداخت خواهد کرد.
قرار بود که این قرارداد در اوایل سال ۲۰۱۷ بسته شود اما پاتریک پویان، رئیس اجرایی شرکت توتال در ماه فوریه گفته بود که منتظر خواهد ماند تا تصمیم دولت دونالد ترامپ، درباره تحریم‌های احتمالی جدید علیه ایران روشن شود.
ترامپ در طول مبارزات انتخاباتی خود تهدید کرده بود، در صورت پیروزی توافق هسته‌ای با ایران را پاره خواهد کرد.
دولت او سیاستی سخت‌گیرانه در رابطه با ایران پیش گرفته و به دلیل برنامه موشکی و فعالیت‌های نظامی ایران در منطقه تحریم‌های جدیدی علیه این کشور اعمال کرده است. با وجود این کاخ سفید اعلام کرده که توافق هسته‌ای با ایران همچنان به قوت خود باقی است.
ایران سومین تولیدکننده بزرگ در میان کشورهای صادرکننده نفت (اوپک) است. پارس جنوبی میدان گازی مشترک میان ایران و قطر است. قطر این میدان عظیم را "میدان شمالی" می‌نامد

قرارداد نفتی با شرکت توتال و شرکت ملی نفت چین واکنش‌های متفاوتی به همراه داشته است. در حالیکه وزیر نفت و مسئولان دولتی این قرارداد را در راستای منافع ملی ارزیابی می‌کنند، عده‌ای آن را "توتالچای" و "کرسنت ۲" می‌نامند.

رگبار انتقاد بر سر قرارداد نفتی با توتال

قرارداد نفتی با شرکت توتال و شرکت ملی نفت چین واکنش‌های متفاوتی به همراه داشته است. در حالیکه وزیر نفت و مسئولان دولتی این قرارداد را در راستای منافع ملی ارزیابی می‌کنند، عده‌ای آن را "توتالچای" و "کرسنت ۲" می‌نامند.
Iran KW45 Öl-Abkommen (IRNA)
قرارداد نفتی با شرکت فرانسوی توتال به بحث‌های زیادی در داخل و خارج از کشور دامن زده است. روز دوشنبه، سوم ژوئیه (۱۲ تیرماه) قراردادی بین سه شرکت فرانسوی توتال، شرکت ملی نفت چین و پتروپارس ایران پیرامون بهره‌برداری از فاز ۱۱ میدان نفتی پارس جنوبی امضا شد.
بر اساس این قرارداد، ۵۰،۱ درصد سهم شرکت توتال، ۳۰ درصد سهم شرکت ملی نفت چین و ۱۹،۹ درصد سهم شرکت پتروپارس خواهد بود. همین موضوع باعث اعتراض و انتقاد شماری از نیروهای مخالف دولت حسن روحانی شد.
پشتیبانی از قرارداد
بیژن زنگنه، وزیر نفت جمهوری اسلامی ایران این انتقادها را ناوارد اعلام کرد و گفت این ارزیابی که سهم توتال بیشتر از سهم ایران است، یک ارزیابی ناصحیح است.

وزیر نفت گفت: «بعضی‌ها گفته‌اند ۵۰ درصد و بعضی‌ها گفته‌اند ۷۰ درصد کل درآمد میدان نفتی‌مان را به خارجی می‌دهیم، این حرف غلط است.»
زنگنه مدعی شد که با احتساب کل درآمد این میدان نفتی تا پایان عمر آن، سهم ایران ۷ برابر سهم شرکت توتال خواهد بود. مبنای محاسبه وزیر نفت جمهوری اسلامی ایران استفاده حداقل ۲۰ ساله از میدان نفتی یاد شده است.

از سوی دیگر، دامنه همکاری ایران با شرکت نفتی توتال محدود به بهره‌برداری از فاز ۱۱ میدان نفتی پارس جنوبی نمی‌شود. قرار است در حوزه پتروشیمی نیز با شرکت توتال همکاری‌هایی صورت گیرد. از آن جمله است، مذاکرات و توافق اولیه‌ای که بر سر سرمایه‌گذاری ۲ میلیارد دلاری توتال در حوزه پتروشیمی صورت گرفته است.
زنگنه عنوان نمود که هدف از این همکاری‌ها، بهره‌برداری از میدان‌های نفتی و گازی مشترک و از جمله میدان آزادگان، یاران، یادآوران و پارس جنوبی است.
از سوی دیگر، علی آهنی، سفیر جمهوری اسلامی ایران در فرانسه نیز، ورود توتال به ایران را موفقیت بزرگی برای ایران دانسته است. آهنی گفته که سرمایه‌گذاری توتال در ایران راه را برای سرمایه‌گذاری دیگر شرکت‌های جهان در صنایع نفت و گاز ایران می‌گشاید.
به باور او، توافق با توتال باعث خواهد شد که دیگر کشورهای اروپایی نیز از سرمایه‌گذاری در ایران نهراسند.
خبرگزاری ایرنا نیز به نقل از علی‌اکبر فرازی، سفیر سابق ایران در مجارستان، قرارداد با شرکت نفتی توتال را جلوه‌ای از "موفقیت دیپلماسی برد-برد جمهوری اسلامی" دانسته است. فرازی این قرارداد را سندی برای اثبات خطای مخالفان داخلی و خارجی توافق هسته‌ای ارزیابی کرده است.
مخالفان قرارداد چه می‌گویند؟
سایت "فرارو" با انتشار مقاله‌ای تحت عنوان "توتالچای یا یک پیروزی بزرگ" به حمایت‌ها و انتقادهای نیروهای موافق و مخالف دولت روحانی اشاره کرده است. انتقادها عمدتا با انشتار مقالاتی در نشریاتی همچون کیهان، جوان، وطن، تسنیم و... مطرح شده‌اند.
بسیاری از مخالفان نسبت به محرمانه بودن متن قرارداد اعتراض دارند. کیهان این قرارداد را "خسارت‌بار" و تسنیم این قرارداد را یک "تخلف" ارزیابی کرده است.
صرف‌نظر از ارزیابی‌های کلی و به کار گرفتن عباراتی چون "توتالچای" یا "کرسنت ۲" در نامه‌ای که بسیج دانشجویی دانشگاه تهران به حسن روحانی نوشته، پرسش‌ها و کاستی‌های این قرارداد به گونه‌ای منسجم‌تر مطرح شده‌اند.
محورهای انتقاد مخالفان این قرارداد از این قرار است:
• سابقه و پیشینه شرکت توتال. زنگنه، وزیر نفت جمهوری اسلامی ایران مدعی است که توتال تا کنون اقدام به لغو هیچ توافق و قراردادی با ایران نکرده است. حال آنکه در نامه بسیج دانشجویی دانشگاه تهران، از خیانت‌های شرکت توتال سخن رفته است.
در این نامه، ذکر شده است که شرکت توتال در شمار نخستین شرکت‌هایی بود که پس از وضع تحریم‌ها ایران را ترک کرد.
• عدم صیانت اطلاعات محرمانه مخازن نفت و گاز کشور. در این نامه تصریح شده که بر اساس مصوبات حقوقی، تحویل اطلاعات مربوط به مخازن نفت و گاز منوط به امضای سند "رازداری و حفظ محرمانگی" بوده و دولت در این خصوص کوتاهی کرده و اطلاعات را بدون امضای چنین سندی در اختیار توتال و شرکت ملی نفت چین قرار داده است.
نویسندگان این نامه در همین رابطه از روحانی پرسیده‌اند: «به راستی مسئولیت افشای اطلاعات محرمانه مخازن نفت و گاز که سرمایه ­های این کشورند بر عهده چه کسی خواهد بود؟ چرا در قبال این بی قانونی صریح، سکوت نموده ­اید؟»
• انتقال فن‌آوری. هدف از فعالیت‌های مشترک، آموزش پرسنلی و انتقال فن‌آوری است. نویسندگان نامه مدعی هستند که دولت در امضای قرارداد با توتال در این زمینه کوتاهی کرده است و از ابتدای اجرای پروژه تا زمان بهره‌برداری، مدیریت پروژه با نیروهای خارجی است و امر انتقال دانش و فن‌آوری پیش‌بینی نشده است.
• نبود تضمین. گفته می‌شود که هرگاه جمهوری اسلامی به هر دلیلی، چه در واکنش به تحریم‌ها یا به قصد بالابردن قیمت، خواستار کاهش تولید نفت خود باشد، نمی‌تواند از تولید قرارداد مشترک نفتی با توتال یا قراردادهای مشابه بکاهد، بلکه باید از تولید نفت در سایر حوزه‌ها چشم پوشی کند.
Mosambik Nampula Tankstelle (DW/J. Beck)
• برخی از مخالفان قرارداد نفتی توتال، این قرارداد را با قرارداد با شرکت نفتی اماراتی کرسنت مقایسه کرده و غیر مستقیم موضوع فساد مالی و رشوه‌خواری در انعقاد چنین قراردادی را مطرح می‌کنند. در جریان قرارداد کرسنت، موضوع فساد مالی در وزارت نفت و از جمله در ارتباط با بیژن زنگنه، وزیر نفت کنونی دولت روحانی مطرح شده بود.
پاسخ مدافعان دولت
روزنامه اعتماد در سرمقاله روز چهارشنبه، ۱۴ تیرماه خود به حملات نیروهای مخالف دولت روحانی به قرارداد توتال پاسخ داده است.
سرمقاله اعتماد که «نقش آقامحمدی در مذاکرات توتال چه بود؟» عنوان دارد، می‌گوید این افراد بدون سند و مدرک مدعی می‌شوند که قراردادهای جدید نفتی در واقع بازگشتن به دوران پیش از ملی شدن صنعت نفت است.
روزنامه اعتماد ادامه می‌دهد: «این افراد لحظه‌ای هم به خود زحمت این را ندادند که بپرسند چگونه ممکن است موضوعی به این مهمی ابتدا در سطوح مدیریتی بالای نظام حل و فصل نهایی نشده باشد. اين افراد زحمت اين را به خود نمی‌دهند كه بپرسند، نقش آقای دكتر آقامحمدی در اين جلسات چيست؟ آيا ايشان نماينده دولت است؟»
علاوه بر حضور آقامحمدی، از اعضای دفتر آیت‌الله خامنه‌ای در مذاکرات توتال، علی‌اکبر ولایتی، رئیس مرکز تحقیقات استراتژیک مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نیز از امضای قرارداد با این شرکت دفاع کرده و آن را گام مهمی در گسترش مناسبات بین دو کشور ایران و فرانسه دانسته است.