S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000167
SIPDIS
E.O. 129
SUBJECT: PRT MUTHANNA: RENTAL SHEIKS AND LOST IRANIAN
WEEKENDS
EF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 3492
R
lassified By: xxxxx for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
C)
¶1. (U) This is a xxxxx reporting cable.
¶2. (S) SUMMARY: xxxxx met with local leader Sheikh xxxxx. During our lengthy discussions the Sheikh shared his belief that the USG has poorly utilized its
s agenda at USG expense. He went on to describe Iranian
gov
influence in Iraq, leaving the way open for Iran to advance
i
ternment attempts to buy his influence on a recent trip he
made to Iran. End Summary.
------------- ---------
A new twist on &what happens in vegas, stays in vegas8 -------------------------------
-¶3. (S) Sheikh xxxxx on January 13 to discuss his recent trip to Iran. He told the xxxxx that he has
been courted by Iranian officials in an effort to garner more uphrates area. He noted that the &handler8 for the tribal
le
Eaders in this area is xxxxx, who has long family ties locally. ¶4. (S) The public reason for xxxxx trip to Tehran was for a medical check-up. He privately told xxxxx that his trip was more for pleasure
than medical treatment and included one or more short-term her entertainment. xxxxx shared that other (unnamed)
tri
tbal leaders had enjoyed similar privileges while guests of the Iranian regime recently. Dashed expectations
------------------- ¶5. (S) The Sheikh suggested that some Iraqi figures are more susceptible to Iranian influence because of disillusionment repeatedly, &Why have the Americans let us
down?8 After he and other tribal sheikhs visited the White
House and met then-President Bush in 2008, he expected to benefit financially from the Americans. Instead, he A). &The
United States did not secure their friends, the sh
feikhs, financially, and has left them vulnerable to Iranian temptations.8 ¶6. (S) xxxxx also complained that while tribal leaders in fairly stable areas used their influence to help minimize
insurgent activities over the past several years, they have nsurgent hotbeds like Anbar, in contrast, received benefit
received nothing for their efforts. Cooperative sheikhs in
is from the Americans. xxxxx cited Abu Risha as an example, noting he received money, projects, and other ers have been
quietly grumbling. He states that he has had
dconversations on this perceived inequity with parliamentarian xxxxx from Diwaniyah. ¶7. (S) Additionally, xxxxx was frustrated with the current regime in Baghdad. He stated that the United
States' support of the Maliki government has only increased
Iran's influence in Iraq, enabling operatives to influence Iraqi government has not made progress in fighting poverty
political decisions and diminish national sovereignty. The , f corruption. He asked if the United States is supporting
I
oran. &Why? Because you have American troops on the ground, but you are advancing Iranian interests without
costing them anything.8 Comment ------- ¶8. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known Q8. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known
for shifting their loyalties based on financial Councils are particularly noteworthy in this regard. Sus
considerations. PM Maliki's Isnad/Tribal Suppor
tceptible sheikhs will trade their influence for financial support and does not independently enjoy a large bankroll. En
especially if the sheikh is not independently wealthy. (Note: xxxx
xd note.) In turn, the sheikh can mobilize supporters, when needed the financial contributions suddenly stop, much of the
(e.g. Ref B). The influence, however, is rented and not bought. If
support may also cease. xxxxx considers this true for Iranian influence in the region as well. If Iran nfluence. If and when the money dries up, so will the coope
continues to pay for support among influential sheikhs, the Islamic Republic will likely increase its
iration among these rented sheikhs. End Comment.
Hill
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